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Abstract 
Arab Revolutions promoted non-violence (selmiyah) at their outset, in conjunction with the 
dignity of the citizen (karama). These mottoes did not resist for a long time against the 
violence of the Deep State, the intolerance of the revolutionary actors, and the geopolitics of 
the region, with the notable exception of Tunisia, where geopolitics were not paramount. This 
article aims at analyzing the manifold features of violence during the transitional period, from 
the ousting of the President Mubarak in February 2011 up to the third anniversary of the 
Revolution in January 25, 2014. It purports to show that grass root level actors (the Black 
Bloc made of Football fans, the secular youth building up the social movement Tamarrod…) 
and institutional ones (the Judiciary, the security forces representing the Interior Ministry, and 
the military at the highest level) rejected the new President from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The latter acted in an inept and partisan manner, dialogue becoming impossible and violent 
rupture becoming unavoidable. The two types of violence (from below and from the Deep 
State) made democratization impossible. The door was opened for a new period of 
authoritarianism under the aegis of the army.The article does not deal with the geopolitics and 
their role in the radicalization within the Egyptian society. 
Keywords: Egyptian Revolution, violence, secular movement, Islamist movement, 
Muslim Brotherhood 
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Resumen 
Las revoluciones árabes en sus inicios promovieron la no violencia (selmiyah), conjuntamente 
con la dignidad de la ciudadanía (karama). Estos lemas no duraron mucho tiempo ante la 
violencia del Viejo Estado, la intolerancia de los actores revolucionarios y la situación 
geopolítica de la región, con la excepción notable de Túnez, donde la geopolítica no jugó un 
papel tan destacable. Este artículo pretende analizar las múltiples caras de la violencia en 
Egipto durante el periodo de transición, que va de la salida del presidente Mubarak en febrero 
de 2011 al tercer aniversario de la Revolución el 25 de enero de 2014. Intenta mostrar que los 
actores de base (el Black Bloc formado por fans de futbol, el aumento de jóvenes seculares, el 
movimiento Tamrrod...) e institucionales (la judicatura, las fuerzas de seguridad 
representantes del Ministerio del Interior, y los militares al más alto nivel) rechazaron el 
nuevo presidente de los Hermanos Musulmanes. Éste último actuó de una manera inepta y 
partidista, el diálogo fue imposible y la ruptura violenta fue inevitable. Los dos tipos de 
violencia (desde abajo y desde el Viejo Estado) imposibilitaron la democratización. Se abrió 
la puerta a un nuevo periodo autoritario bajo la tutela de las fuerzas armadas. El artículo no se 
adentra en la geopolítica ni en su papel en la radicalización de la sociedad egipcia. 
Palabras clave: Revolution Egipcia, violencia, movimiento secular, movimiento 
islamista, Hermanos Musulmanes
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The Change in the Status of Violence 
 
he status of violence largely changed within the Arab Revolutions 
during the last three years, from the end of 2010 when the Jasmin 
Revolution broke up in Tunisia and the Egyptian 25 January 
Revolution put an end to Mubarak regime up to the beginning of 
2014, after a military coup put and end to the constitutional yet inept 
presidency of Morsi, the first legally elected President in Egypt.  
The first Arab Revolutions, the Tunisian and Egyptian, had a dual 
leitmotiv based on non-violence and peacefulness, crystallized in the Arabic 
word selmiyah as well as the dignity of the citizen (karamah). Violence was 
the modus operandi of the Power that Be. Even during the Jasmin 
Revolution (Tunisia) and January 25 Revolution (Egypt) violence could be 
qualified as “moderate”, taking into account the standards of the region and 
the long tradition of State repression in most of the Muslim world: in 
Tunisia, the death toll was around 338 people (Associated Press, 2012), and 
in Egypt, 8461 during the revolution proper. This relatively limited number 
of deaths was in part due to the swift overthrow of the autocratic 
governments (28 days in Tunisia, 18 days in Egypt). The precipitate 
Tunisian-Egyptian model of revolution was not replicated in the other cases 
and the death toll was by far higher: in Yemen, more than 2.000 up to the 
departure of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Al-Haj, 2012), in Libya, 
around 30.000 (Karin, 2011), and the civil war in Syria caused more than 
100.000 deaths up to June 2013 (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 
2013), and the end of the crises in the Arab world is not in sight. In some 
cases, after the overthrow of the old regime, the death toll continued to rise, 
as in Egypt where few hundreds died after the end of the Old Regime, before 
the military coup of the 3rd July 2013. After the Coup d’Etat, over 80 Morsi 
supporters were killed in a clash with the Republican Guards on 8 July, and 
over 70 were killed during protests towards the end of the month (Crisis 
Watch, 2013).  
In Egypt, the symbolic status of violence changed after the revolution, 
and one could distinguish three major periods, with distinct features: 
- the period from February 10, 2011 (the ousting of Mubarak) up to the 
election of the President Morsi in June 2012. During this period, the armed 
T 
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forces ruled the country through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). 
- the period extending from the election of Morsi to his overthrow, the 
elected Parliament being dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
wing Freedom and Justice Party, and the President coming from its ranks.  
- the period beginning with the overthrow of Morsi by the military, in 
alliance with a large part of the secular opposition parties joined by the 
Salafi Nour party, Ahmed el-Tayeb the head of al-Azhar Mosque, and the 
Coptic Pope Tawadros, after large demonstrations launched by the 
opposition and a new born association, Tamarrod that alleged having 
gathered millions of signatures for the demise of the President. In this 
period, a new chapter opened up in terms of violence: the military joined by 
the opposition alleged that the dismissal of the late president was a 
legitimate act of insubordination in continuity with the spirit of January 25 
Revolution, in order to prevent Morsi’s dictatorship under the banner of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The followers of the deposed President rejected 
this view and called his removal a military coup. Their reaction has been so 
far sit-ins and large demonstrations in large towns and cities, in particular in 
Cairo and Alexandria, the military shooting and killing more than hundred 
people and maiming many hundreds. Violence changed in its nature: it was 
not anymore due to the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
representatives to tackle the unruly situation after the revolution, but to a 
new type of government willing to impose its diktat to the rest of the society. 
The new type of violence put into question the claim by the opposition to 
follow a democratic line of conduct, the military yielding the ultimate 
power. At the same time, repression by the military made the MB a “martyr 
political institution”, its status changing from and arrogant, inept and “total” 
organization into a persecuted, unjustly mistreated human group. There was 
a “symbolic rupture” in the status of the MB based on the rapid change of 
mood and vision in the revolutionary situations: during the interim period 
when the Egyptian army ruled the country, its incompetence and defying 
attitude caused it to be abhorred by the people and in particular, the “Tahrir 
youth”. After the election of Morsi, a year after, the same vilified army 
became a savior and many of the Tahrir youth members called for the 
military intervention under the banner of the Tamarrod movement. More 
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generally, the rupture in the general mood in Egypt resulted from the 
situation of instability and opaque political future that induced many young 
people to change rapidly their view on the major actors of the revolution: the 
revolutionary youth, the MB hierarchy, the opponents…. 
 
 
The Three Periods of the Egyptian Revolution 
 
In Tunisia and Egypt, before and during the revolution the most visible 
revolutionary actors were secular2 in their outlook, young in age, belonging 
mostly to the middle classes, some to the Arab Diaspora in the West. In 
Egypt, the protesters gathering at Tahrir Square in Cairo were mostly secular 
Muslims, jointly celebrating prayers with Christians (Copts) in order to show 
their non-sectarian view of citizenship (International Crisis Group, 2011).  
After the overthrow of the authoritarian regime, a new type of activist 
became prominent. In the first period, the protesters were anti-authoritarian 
and pro-democracy, whereas many post-revolutionary actors regarded 
themselves as engagé Muslims, identifying with either the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or the Salafis. These actors came as a shock to the 
predominantly “secular” and “liberal” Muslims for whom religion was not 
the major issue in the mobilizations that ended the autocratic rule 
(Khosrokhavar & Nikpey, 2009)3. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were more familiar to the public, the organization having had a long history 
of political opposition, dating back to 1928 when it was founded by Hassan 
el Banna. Salafis were more of a surprise as social and political activists to 
many people (the MB included), since under Mubarak the group defined 
itself as nonpolitical, and promoted Islamization from below, rejecting 
political activity as illegitimate against the Islamic ruler, adopting thus a 
quietist version of Islam. 
Compared to the secular, modernist youth that was at the heart of the 
incipient revolutionary movement, the MB and Salafi actors presented 
another picture of the revolution. The actors of the first period gradually 
became convinced that the revolution “was stolen” by the Islamists who in 
their eyes betrayed the ideals of the popular uprising (LeVine, 2011).  
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Political parties became more autonomous towards their respective 
religious associations, as for instance in gender equality, MB inclining 
towards the limitation of women’s freedom in the name of religious 
orthodoxy, whereas the Freedom and Justice party, the political branch of 
MB, took a much more ambivalent stance (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013). 
Secular, liberal parties denounced the Islamists’ dichotomy between their 
political and religious stance as hypocrisy and double game. 
After the presidential elections in Egypt, in which Morsi from the MB 
became the head of the State, in less than a year a process of polarization set 
in. Political opposition, in many ways divided, was able to wield a 
semblance of unity under the banner of an alliance, the National Salvation 
Front, rejecting Morsi’s rule and finding no common language with him to 
salvage democracy. Morsi’s presidency was marked by the lack of dialogue 
with the opposition, the refusal to find compromise with it on the new 
constitution and on the “ruling style” of the new government. In November 
2012 he issued a Presidential decree granting him temporarily powers 
reminiscent of the Mubarak era, beyond the reach of any court within the 
prevailing juridical system. The decree made it possible to draft, through an 
Assembly dominated by the MB, to hastily draft a constitution that was 
rejected by the opposition as being too much dominated by the MB Islamism 
and too inauspicious towards religious minorities (the Copts) and women’s 
freedom.  
Thus initial mutual suspicion at the beginning of Morsi’s presidency gave 
way to utter distrust and frontal rejection, Morsi’s inability to rule with 
respect to the political continuity of the government being brandished by the 
opposition as utter signs of failure by the MB, not only to promote 
democracy, but also, to assure the management of the bureaucracy: the 
contradictory rules set by Morsi as to his rights to yield absolute power 
before revoking it partially in November 2012, then the question of bombing 
Ethiopia for the Dam being built on Nile, a discussion that was supposed to 
be secret but was shown on TV... (Egypt Independent, 2013). 
As for the personal freedom, many cases of police torture, denial of 
habeas corpus, arbitrary sentences (Bassem Youssef, the star of the satirical 
TV show El Bernameg, The Program, was prosecuted for having maligned 
the President in January 2013), street violence against the protestors and 
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other breaches of the law were recorded on an almost daily basis by the 
media or through the blogs. MB was accused of attempting at “brotherizing” 
(putting under the aegis of the Muslim Brotherhood) the educational sector 
(Abdel-Hamid, 2013). Secular women were also suspicious of the MB 
presidency of attempting at reducing their rights in the name of an orthodox 
Islamic view (Kirckpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013). On the international 
Women’s Rights Day, March the 8th, demonstrations were held against the 
MB statements putting into question the legal equality of men and women in 
the name of the religion, after Ikhwanweb, the official website of the MB 
criticized a United Nations’ text on violence against women, characterizing 
it as a cultural invasion by the West against Muslim countries (Frémont, 
2013). 
Intellectuals protest over the “Islamization” of the culture by the MB 
ministers, showing their suspicion over the government’s bias against 
secular values in the name of which, they believed, the Egyptian revolution 
was made.  
The MB government purported to curtail the power of the judges, many 
of whom were suspected of sympathy towards the remnants of the Old 
Regime (the “Folul”) or the secular opposition. The Shura Council, 
dominated by the government, endeavored to limit the power of the judiciary 
whose members refused to abide by the new restrictions imposed on the 
judicial authority on May 2013.  
Many major artists rebelled against the newly appointed Minister of 
Culture Alaa Abdel Aziz who had removed Ines Abdel Dayem, the head of 
the Cairo Opera House, and Salah el-Meligy, the head of the Applied arts 
Department at the ministry, holding a sit-in inside the ministry on June 5, 
2013, demanding his dismissal (Iskander, 2013). In the same fashion, 
students, long time allies of the MB under Mubarak regime, reject the 
government’s rule in the name of their new democratic vision. In the 
election of the students’ trade union on March 2013, the MB lost its majority 
to the “liberals” (Al-Naggar, 2013).  
Many districts in the major towns and cities take the bits in their hands. 
In Port Saeed, on March the 3rd, in clashes with the protestors, three 
policemen were killed, the army taking the sides of the demonstrators and 
separating them from the security forces. In Alexandria, on March 29, 
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demonstrations swept the governorates against the MB crackdown on 
freedom and the recent interrogation of opposition activists. The supporters 
of the MB clashed with the demonstrators in a district of Alexandria, Sidi 
Gaber, in the evening, both sides using Molotov cocktails and stones. 
Violence erupted as well in another district of Alexandria against the MB 
headquarters. In Suez, activists agathered in Arbaeen Square afther Friday 
prayers, to demand the prosecutor general’s resignation and the restriction of 
freedoms. In Kafr al-Sheikh City, Dostur Party and Kefaya Movement 
members staged a protest (MENA, 2013). In Nasr City, April 6 Youth 
Movement staged a protest in front of Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim’s 
home, and four of its members were arrested (Al-Youm, 2013). The same 
was repeated in many other towns, denouncing the MB policies, the 
muzzling of freedom and the MB’s appointment of authorities with no 
competence or allegiance to the MB. Clashes between the pro and anti-Morsi 
erupt in Alexandria on April the 5th 2013, each side hurling stones against 
the other, security forces firing teargas to disperse them. Protesters called on 
the military to return to power and remove Morsi from office (Al-Youm, 
2013).  
On the whole, the period after the Presidential elections was one of the 
most troublesome in the history of Egypt. In terms of demonstrations, 
between January and May, Egypt witnessed 5.544 demonstrations, the 
highest number in the world. In May alone, 1.300 protest movements were 
recorded, an average of two protests an hour, 42 a day, and 325 a week, 
according to the democracy index published by the International 
Development Center (Egypt Independent, 2013). During the Morsi’s 
presidency, 9.427 protests were recorded (Taha, 2013). This seminal period 
as the transition from the old authoritarian to a new political system was 
interspersed with many disillusionments on the part of the activists who 
strongly came to believe that the revolution was betrayed by the MB, and the 
solution was another revolution, toppling Morsi from power. The widening 
gap between the anticipations and the political reality made a stable political 
system almost impossible, every social group finding fault with it, students, 
workers, jobless people, middle class seculars, the political elite with the 
exception of the MB members, secular women, young activists… 
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Two types of protest movements took place, each sapping the fledging 
democracy: large scale protest movements and small one’s called by the 
authorities, in a derogatory manner, the small-group protests (ihtijajat 
fi’awiya), in reference to working class movements, and the large 
demonstrations (Sallam, 2011). The most fragile people (working class, 
peasants) witnessed their incomes dramatically decreasing due to the 
regression of the economy. Authorities referred to the small-scale protest 
movements based on special interests (corporatist interests) to characterize 
those advancing demands related to the redistribution of wealth (higher 
wages, improved working conditions…). After the Egyptian revolution, 
authorities, be it the army or the MB leadership following Morsi’s election, 
denounced these claims as anti-economic, accusing labor movement as 
undermining the fragile post-revolutionary economy. This is due in part to 
the fact that after the revolution, from May 2011 up to April 2012 the total 
number of labor protests rose to 1.137 cases, almost twice as the 584 protests 
in the previous year (Abdalla, 2012). According to another set of data, the 
Egyptian labor strikes and protests during the year 2012 rose to 3.800, most 
of which occurred after the election of Morsi (Ibrahim, 2013). The rising 
expectations due to the revolution as well as the frustration of the working 
class people in conjunction with the deterioration of the general situation of 
the national economy embittered many sectors of the Egyptian labor against 
Morsi. Added to the revolutionary youth’s deep mistrust of the MB and the 
deteriorating economic situation, the road was opened to the military coup. 
 
 
Typology of Violence 
 
After the Egyptian revolution, street violence in different forms spread in 
many towns and cities. One can propose a typology of it.  
 
Violence against Women 
 
The distinguishing feature of the Arab Revolutions is not so much that 
women took part in them. They did so since long ago, for instance in the 
Algerian independence movement (1954–1962), in which official estimates 
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put them at around 3% (about 11,000) of the total number of fighters. Some 
women fighters like Djamila Boupacha achieved international fame. But 
they did not don the status of a leader, even at the local level, being mainly 
foot soldiers or grass root activists. The situation changed with the new Arab 
Revolutions in which some women achieved the status of local or even 
national leaders. In Egypt Asma Mahfouz became one of the few street 
leaders, even before the protest movement that led to the overthrow of 
Mubarak in January 2011. In Yemen, Tawakul Karman, a journalist activist, 
became one of the opposition leaders against President Saleh. She won the 
Nobel Peace Price for her global action.  
The paradox of women’s place in the revolutionary periods in Egypt (but 
also Tunisia) is that many female participants played a significant role, 
achieved individual fame and showed capacity for leadership during the 
protest movement proper that led to the overthrow of the despotic 
governments but did not translate it into political organizations that could 
defend their cause against the Islamic patriarchy. Women, individually 
speaking, were present not only as foot soldiers, but also as leading figures 
(Al Jazeera, 2011). Organizationally, however, they were weak and had no 
say in the political matters, due to their lack of close ties with political 
parties that might defend their cause. Individually strong, collectively weak, 
the new generation of women was at best fragile in the political aftermath of 
the Arab Spring, although they were highly visible and conscious of their 
revolutionary role in bringing down autocracy in the initial street protests.  
The scarcity of women as social actors in the Arab world, be they secular 
or Islamist, is related to the patriarchal prejudices, but also to their own 
inability to build up prominence within the political structures and parties. 
Political leaders do not consider them as assets to defend (Daily Motion, 
2012), since they have not been collectively active within associations and 
political groupings on the political scene.  
In the parliamentary elections after the Egyptian Revolution, women held 
2% of the seats, down from the 12% in the last elections held under Mubarak 
(Fadel & Hassieb, 2012). But the 2010 elections were rigged according to 
many contenders, the outcome being still perceived by secular women as a 
positive step towards the recognition of their status as citizens. 
Institutionally, the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions seem to have pushed 
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secular women towards a regressive political and social status, whereas they 
heightened at the same time their self-awareness as citizens. The number of 
women in the parliament dwindled after the revolution and women felt they 
were loosing their gains in terms of legal equality at the hands of the 
Islamists. Still, there were few exceptions and a beginning of self-awareness 
that might bear its fruits in the future (Eriksen, 2011). 
Violence against women began before the overthrow of the Old regime. 
In Egypt, women were molested by thugs (Baltajiya), the army submitted 
them to virginity tests (Ortiz, 2011), and female journalists were mistreated 
in order to intimidate them, be they from the Diaspora, or Egyptians. In June 
2011, the popular writer Mona Eltahawy brought to light the issue as part of 
a strategy by the military hierarchy to prevent women from participating in 
the protest activities. The case of Samira Ibrahim, the 25 year old Egyptian 
human rights activist became widely known after she filed a legal case 
against the military.  
In reaction to the violence against them, women demonstrated, in 
particular in Cairo, close to the symbolic Tahrir square, to protest against 
military rule and the harsh treatment of female protesters by the security 
forces. Many men joined them on December 20, 2011 out of sympathy for 
them4.  
After the revolution, Salafis pushed toward the exclusion of women from 
the public sphere. Women Salafis became involved in promoting Sharia 
(Islamic law) and putting pressure on those women who asked for gender 
equality, violence against activist women finding tacit approval among them.  
In the mobilization by Tamarrod and the opposition political parties 
against Morsi’s presidency, women did play a significant role, but still, they 
were not able to convert it into political clout, partly awed by the global 
movement against Morsi, partly divided between Islamists and secular, 
family dependent, unable to build up autonomous feminist groups with the 
exception of small groups within the secular women. 
Another factor favoring violence against women was their massive 
appearance on the public sphere during the Arab revolutions. Since Salafis 
became politicized as well and sought to appear on the same public sphere, 
their first acts of self-vindication was violence against women who “dared” 
dispute them their primacy by breaking down the barriers with men. Their 
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violence took varied forms, physical, psychological and moral. The army 
too, was keen to resend women to their homes in order to violently dispute 
with men the hegemony. Women, present on the public sphere, were trouble-
makers, those who disputed the gender frontiers and therefore, put male 
tradition in question. Post-revolutionary male actors usually take to heart the 
reassignment of women to a less prominent place in terms of visibility, so as 
to exclusively occupy themselves the public sphere and give their hegemony 
a symbolic basis. In Egypt, virginity tests against women, their rape, their 
mistreatment during and after the demonstrations, all these actions had a 
common denominator: pushing back women to the private sphere and 
restoring the old order, threatened by women’s meteoric emergence in Tahrir 
Square. The function of violence, in this case, in the four phases of the 
Egyptian revolution (overthrowing Mubarak, the transition period under the 
aegis of the army, Morsi’s reign, and the coup d’Etat against him) was to 
push back women to their previous places and cleanse the public sphere of 
them. Women, on the other hand, had a relatively easy game to assert 
themselves during the revolution proper, but they did not build up adequate 
mechanisms (political parties, NGOs, clubs…) strong enough to defend their 
cause against the Salafis, the army and all those institutions that militate 
against gender equality.  
 
Sectarian Violence 
 
In Egypt, sectarian violence primordially expresses itself through the 
opposition between the Islamists and the Christian minority (the Copts) who 
make up around 10% of the population, and to a lesser degree, with tiny 
minorities, Shias and Bahais. The roots of the tension are old but the role of 
modern politics in igniting it is undeniable (Osman, 2013). During Sadat’s 
presidency, Islamist groups who targeted the Copts were used as a means to 
fight against leftist activism. In 1981, during his reign, 81 Copts were killed 
in the Cairo working-class neighborhood, Zawiya al-Hamra. During 
Mubarak’s presidency, Islamist groups were severely repressed but Copts 
became somehow hostage to the regime that infused them with a sense of 
insecurity in order to assure their obedience. The fear of Islamists was 
further used to insure the Copts’ support to the regime. In the post-
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revolutionary era, the attacks against the Copts were initiated by the Salafis, 
but in some cases, the army was directly involved, as in 9-10 October 2011 
demonstrations, when the army attacked Coptic protesters near the Maspero 
state TV building, 28 people being killed, most of them Copts (Carr, 2011).  
After the January 25 Revolution, sectarian violence erupted again by the 
Salafis will to impose an ultra-orthodox version of Islam. But violence was 
specific in each event, involving the police and more generally, the security 
forces, the army, the sympathizers of the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the Copts, and radicalized groups on all sides. The case of Khosous, a town 
in the Delta governorate of Qalyubia, shows this complexity, once we look 
at it in detail (Afify, 2013). There, sectarian clashes erupted on April the 5th, 
2013, spilling over the next days to other towns and cities. In Khosous, 
Christians regarded the police as not protecting them, most of the time 
withdrawing from the scenes of violence rather than assisting them against 
the assailants. On the day of the incident, two coffee shops were entirely 
destroyed and many buildings bore scorch marks. The stories and the 
interpretations of the people were different, influenced by their identification 
with one side or the other, and their presence at one moment or another, at 
the scene of the violence. In most cases of sectarian violence in Egypt, 
personal conflict between few people turns into a sectarian street clash and 
escalate into an all-out attack. The fight might be between two individuals 
on petty affairs, but it can become a clash between a Muslim and a Christian. 
On Friday, April the 5th, a small incident swell progressively and two days 
later, on Sunday, ended up in the large scale attack on St Mark’s Coptic 
Cathedral in Cairo’s Abbassiya district. 
In many cases, a family or a group of people are identified as being at the 
core of the conflict. On April 5, the family of the lawyer Samir Iskandar, 
formerly affiliated with the Mubarak regime, was involved in a dispute 
involving Christians. A Muslim was killed. Then, Muslims in the area 
attacked and killed four Christians, apparently at random. According to 
eyewitnesses, a Muslim man harassing a Christian woman set off the feud. 
For a third group of eyewitnesses, Muslims were provoked by a drawing of a 
cross on an Islamic center, belonging to Al-Azhar. A fourth group put the 
blame on thugs from outside the district who created the turmoil against the 
Christians. A fifth group, made of women who lived in the corner and had 
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witnessed the clashes from their beginning, alleged that Farouk Awad, 
Iskandar’s cousin, who lived in a building facing the Al-Azhar’s Islamic 
Institute where the clashes began, shouted at a group of children playing 
with a can of paint in the adjacent building. Their drawings on the building 
close to the Islamic Institute bore names and nicknames like Mostafa and a 
sign close to a swastika that children drew without knowledge of its 
meaning. Children refused to listen to Awad and he became furious, starting 
to fire his gun in the air in an attempt to scare them away, accidentally 
shooting a Muslim bystander who died later on. A woman yelled in the 
street that her son was shot and in a few minutes, a massacre happened. 
Weapons being available to the people and the security forces being absent, 
the feud escalated. Muslims began targeting randomly Christians around the 
town, capturing a Christian and setting him ablaze in the middle of the street.  
Then rumor was spread that a cross was put by Christians on the Islamic 
Institute. The authorities, without inspecting the scene of the events, 
officially stated the story of the cross on the building as the cause of the 
deadly events.  
Another interpretation by the people put the blame on an unknown 
individual who transformed a feud between two families involving an 
accidental shooting into a sectarian conflict. The ninth interpretation claimed 
that it was the local mosque’s imam who announced the death of the Muslim 
victim over a loudspeaker and urged Muslims to massacre Christians. 
Rumormongering and local tensions play a significant role in these feuds, 
the authorities becoming most of the time one of the rumormongers, rather 
than an impartial arbiter. 
Clashes in Khosous were renewed on Sunday evening with the attacks on 
the funeral of the four Christian victims of Khosous at the Abbassiya 
cathedral in Cairo. The clash at the cathedral transformed  local sectarian 
dispute into a national one. Security forces fired tear gas into the Cathedral 
and two deaths resulted in the afternoon, continuing into the night. In 
Khosous, on Sunday, Muslims and Christians became entangled in a battle 
with weapons on both sides, each targeting the business owned by the other. 
The police fled the scene, according to the eyewitnesses, and the lights in the 
areas were cut off.  
International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1)  15 
 
 
The official reaction to the clashes by Essam al-Haddad, one of the 
spokesmen of the Presidency, put the blame on the Christians for igniting 
violence in both Khosous and Abbasiya, espousing the argument that 
Christians painted an insulting graffiti on the wall of an al-Azhar building in 
Khosous.  
Another type of sectarian violence is generally based on rumors 
concerning a Muslim woman forced to convert to Christianity or one who 
would like to convert to Islam and is prevented from doing so by his family 
or the Christian community. On 8 May 2011, just few months after the 
Egyptian revolution, a night of street fighting between Muslims and 
Christians left at least 12 deaths, six Christians and six Muslims, around 220 
people wounded, and two churches set ablaze in the Cairo suburb of Imbala. 
According to the eyewitnesses, fighting opposed one group of begrudged 
and jobless youth against another. Rumors gravitated around the interfaith 
romance. A young Muslim came to fetch his former Christian wife, who had 
converted to Islam and had married him, but she had recently disappeared 
and according to him, she had been kidnapped and held in the Church of St. 
Mina5. This pattern of a convert to Islam, whose community refuses her new 
faith and imprisons her is recurrent in the sectarian clashes in Egypt. 
Christians in the neighborhood said that no such woman was in the church 
and the local police agreed.   
Mobile phone technology is put at the service of this sectarian violence: 
people call each other to come to the street in defense of their community 
and their number swells, making the confrontation bloodier.  
The resurgence of sectarian violence is in a large part due to the 
emergence of the fundamentalist Salafis who believe that Islamic Sharia 
should be applied in relation to the other faiths in Egypt. The crisis of the 
state and the disorganization of the security forces as well as their taking 
sides with the Salafis against the Copts, render the problem the more 
insoluble.  
Feeling alienated by the Morsi government, and insecure for the defense 
of their churches and houses by the MB authorities, Copts turned against the 
latter and in the street demonstrations for toppling the government, they 
actively participated. After the overthrow of Morsi, the ire of the MB 
sympathizers turned against them. Many churches were burnt (according to 
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the NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights), since August 14, 2013 at 
least 25 churches were set ablaze and many Coptic schools, houses and 
shops were attacked in 10 out of the 27 provinces of Egypt. The Youth 
Maspero Movement put the numbers much higher, 39 churches being 
attacked in many different towns and cities.  
 
Violence Between the Secular and the Islamist Actors 
 
True or not, secular people in Egypt believed that they were the main actors 
of the revolutionary wave that overthrew the Mubarak regime. This 
perception was put into question when they lost the first parliamentary 
elections to the Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and to a lesser degree, to 
the Salafis) (Husain, 2012), held between November 2011 and January 2012. 
The Freedom and Justice Party (the political party affiliated to the MB) 
obtained 37,5% of the votes, the Al-Nour Party (Salafis) 27,8%, and the rest 
was split among numerous political parties, some belonging to the secular-
revolutionary trend. The feeling of a “symbolic violence” was strong right 
from the moment the Muslim Brotherhood held the majority in the 
Parliament and was further intensified with the election of Morsi as the 
President of Egypt.  
Since Morsi’s presidency in June 2012 and his attempts, regarded as 
imposing a new Constitution that betrayed the revolution’s ideals from the 
Seculars’ viewpoint, violence against the Muslim Brotherhood became one 
of the constant features of the street protests in Egypt. In Alexandria, at the 
end of March 2013, demonstrations swept in protest against the 
government’s crackdown on freedom and mistreatment of the opposition 
activists. In Sidi Gabi, a district in Alexandria, the clashes ended up with the 
two sides throwing Molotov cocktails and stones at each other. On the 
evening of Friday March 29, 2013, dozens of protesters skirmished with 
security forces at the MB headquarters in Zagazig district of Alexandria. 
Protesters targeted them in a march, but large number of MB sympathizers 
and members were stationed there to protect the building (MENA, 2013). 
These affairs and the way they were dealt with was regarded as the sign of 
Muslim Brotherhood’s direct implication in the matters pertaining to the 
government. In most cases the police and the military refused to intervene in 
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order to defend the MB centers. The movement against President Morsi and 
the MB radicalized gradually. On Friday March 29, 2013, a small number of 
activists marched from Tahrir Square to the High Court late afternoon, 
demanding the fall of Morsi, the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Prosecutor General Talaat Abdallah’s dismissal. At the High Court, 
altercations broke out when some protesters began chanting for army rule, 
saying: “The army is ours, the supreme guide is not”. Other demonstrators 
objected to the chants. 
Central Security Forces were deployed to the High Court’s main lobby 
mid-Friday afternoon, reinforcing the already heavy security presence in 
place since this morning. Hundreds of demonstrators continued to flock to 
the area, assembling in front of the prosecutor general’s office in the court 
complex. Dozens of protesters began gathering outside the High Court 
earlier on Friday afternoon in preparation for a protest they called, "We are 
not to be intimidated". They chanted, "We will not go, he (Morsi) shall go", 
"The people want to bring down the regime", "I am not a coward, I am not a 
(Muslim) Brother", "Morsi, leave!" and "Secular, secular, we do not want a 
Brotherhood [state]” (Egypt Independent, 2013). 
Thus the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the President Morsi and 
the Islamists by secular forces tended to blend in a single protest movement 
that threatened to mutate street violence into a general civil war.  
Representatives of 12 youth groups, including the Dostour Party, Free 
Egyptians Party, the Kefaya Movement, the Second Revolution of Anger 
and Maspero Youth Union, held a meeting Tuesday, March 26, 2013, at the 
Youth for Freedom and Justice Movement headquarters to discuss their 
Friday plans. They announced that they would perform Friday prayers 
outside the prosecutor general’s office at the High Court in Cairo (Egypt 
Independent, 2013). They demanded the dismissal of Prosecutor General 
Talaat Abdallah, Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki and Interior Minister 
Mohamed Ibrahim after Abdallah issued arrest warrants for five activists 
accused of inciting clashes near the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in 
Moqattam the week before. They also called for the public prosecutor to 
summon Brotherhood members involved in violent incidents around 
Moqattam and the Ettehadiya President Palace, and accused the judiciary of 
bias and unfairness. 
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Radicalization of the secular and leftist political parties demanding an 
end to the President’s rule and their direct confrontation with the security 
forces in the name of the revolutionary ideals frequently ended up in 
physical violence. Disrespect for the “rules” became an almost permanent 
feature of the demonstrations, security forces acting more or less arbitrarily 
towards them, between the sheer absence of police forces to the 
disproportionate repression of the protesters.  
The deep frustration of the secular forces pushed them towards activism, 
first street activism, then alliance with the military to overthrow Morsi. 
Tamarrod movement became symbolically very important against Morsi, a 
high number of signatures (claimed without any tangible proof to be around 
22 millions, a number by far superior to the 13 million people who voted for 
Morsi) being gathered that asked for his resignation. 
The number of the people taking part in the street movement on June 29 
was highly overblown, mythical numbers of people being supposed to have 
taken part in the street protest6. Disinformation and widespread distortion of 
reality found a large echo in the international media who uncritically 
reproduced the excessively inflated number of protesters, unwillingly 
legitimizing the military coup that toppled the government. Violence and 
hundreds of deaths were the outcome of the coup, with an enduring political 
crisis. 
  
Violence and the Security Forces 
 
Police stations, under Mubarak, were the local representatives of power, 
mostly inspiring fear. After the revolution, the police was targeted as one of 
the main culprits, having allegedly tortured or caused the death of many 
citizens during the 18 days demonstrations that overthrew the Mubarak 
regime. Citizens awaited the trial of the culprits among the security. 
Disappointment overcame many activists who did not see any major 
prosecution against the police forces, nor any change of their harsh style of 
repression. 
Since the election of Morsi in June 2012, a new type of tension between 
the MB and the police on the one side, the opposing activists on the other 
took place. On March the 3rd, in Port Said, three policemen were killed in the 
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street protests. Violent clashes opposed demonstrators and policemen at the 
Tahrir Square. The same phenomenon took place in Suez, Kafr al-Sheikh, 
and Qalyubia. In these demonstrations President Morsi was perceived as the 
Trojan Horse of the MB, instrumental in assuring its hegemony on the 
government (Al-Tahrir, 2013).  
After the military coup in July 2013, many thousands of MB members or 
sympathizers were arrested (around 8000 according to some estimates), and 
around 1000 demonstrators against the coup d’Etat were arrested, the “worst 
Mass Unlawful Killings in Country’s Modern History” happening on August 
14, 2013 killings, the death toll amounting to 638 people, of which 595 
civilians and 43 police officers, with at least 3,994 injured, according to the 
Egyptian Health Ministry (Human Rights Watch, 2013). However, the 
Muslim brotherhood and National Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy 
(NCSL) put the number of deaths from the Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya 
Mosque sit-in alone at some 2,600.  
 
Symbolic Violence 
 
Many types of violence intermingled in Egypt after the revolution, one of 
them involving irony and desecration of the Power-that-be, in the very 
person of the President Morsi. In a situation of relative calm where 
institutions would work properly, this type of violence might reinforce civil 
society and remind power holders of their conditional legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. But in a situation where street violence had become almost 
endemic, symbolic violence through irony and sarcasm became a tool 
reinforcing the crisis of legitimacy. One prominent case was the popular TV 
satirist Bassem Youssef. On March 30, 2013 he was accused by the public 
prosecutor of insulting the President Morsi and denigrating Islam. Filing suit 
was regarded by the opposition as a sign of authoritarianism by the 
government, acting according to the old autocratic style. A week earlier, the 
public prosecutor ordered the arrest of five activists, charging them for the 
use of social media in order to incite violence against the MB. This attitude 
raised the scepter of press censorship in the eyes of many revolutionary 
actors (Fahim & El Sheik, 2013).  
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Majority political figures became the target of the attacks, Morsi but also 
some of his ministers and more generally, the MB hierarchy. Symbolic and 
physical violence were combined in order to dethrone the President and the 
MB as an organization. 
In an incident regarding Morsi, activists spread clover plants across the 
presidential yard, a symbolic suggestion that he was an animal that needed 
common livestock feed. Mourad Ali, the Freedom and Justice Party’s media 
advisor, the political party created by the MB, posted a statement on the FJP 
Facebook page: “What they did by raising underwear in front of the interior 
minister’s house is [a sign of] moral collapse that is even worse than what 
they did last week, attempting to insult the President by scattering Egyptian 
clover in front of his house" (Al-Youm, 2013). 
Security forces arrested four members of the April 6 Youth Movement on 
Friday March 29th, 2013, during a protest staged in front of Interior Minister 
Mohamed Ibrahim’s home in Nasr City. According to the security officials, 
dozens of protesters illegally penetrated into the minister’s house at 
midnight, some with Molotov cocktails. Early in the morning, the protesters 
raised underwear and vilified him as a “slut”. A source from the Cairo 
security department said the troops fired tear gas to disperse the protesters, 
but April 6 accused security of firing bird shot as well, injuring some of their 
members.  
In the eyes of the opposition, the figureheads of the President and his 
major ministers as well as the leadership of the MB had been irreparably 
destroyed at the symbolic level, before being demised by the military coup. 
 
Violence against Civil Society Organizations 
 
This type of violence consists in attacking, repressing or simply closing 
down civil society organizations. Before the election of the first new 
President, the military ruled Egypt, between February 2011 and June 2012. 
During that period, human rights and pro-democracy organizations were 
targeted. Some of them were funded by American donors and were closed 
down (like National Democratic Institute and the International Republican 
Institute, both affiliated with the two major US political parties, the Freedom 
House), others by German ones (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). They were 
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officially suspected of spreading unrest in the country. 17 civil society 
organizations were thus scapegoated by the military, to vindicate their 
repression against the “foreign” institutions that spread unrest into the 
country (Beaumont & Harris, 2011).   
 
Jihadist Violence 
 
With the toppling of Morsi government, Egypt witnessed the significant 
return of jihadist violence, first and foremost in the Sinai desert areas, and 
then in major cities. After the demise of Morsi by the army on July the 3rd 
2013, the repression against the MB began swiftly, ending up in August 14, 
2013 with the killing of more than 1000 people at the Rabaa al-Adawiya 
Mosque (official estimates, 638 people killed, according to the MB, more 
than 2600). Gradually, part of the MB youth, angered by the lack of action 
by the organization’s officials separated and joined violent groups, mainly 
Jihadist ones.  
Besides that, the Arab Revolutions released from jail or received from 
exile thousands of Jihadists and in Egypt alone, around 1200 militants could 
join Islamist militant groups (Dettmer, 2013). The latter, mainly al-Furqan 
Brigades, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and the Jamal Network were reinforced, first 
through the conciliatory attitude of the Morsi government that tried to 
persuade their members to join peaceful movements and then, after Morsi’s 
removal, found a new legitimacy among part of the revolutionary youth who 
revolted against the military coup against the democratically elected Morsi 
government. According to the major Jihadist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, the Egyptian army’s coup demonstrated “the soundness of the 
Jihadi project and the choice of the ammunition box over the ballot box” 
(Dettmer, 2013). 
In December 2013, prior to the third anniversary of the Egyptian 
Revolution (January 25), many attacks occurred, in Mansoura (Nile’s Delta) 
on December 24, killing 15 people. On December 26, a bomb exploded in 
Cairo, killing 5 people. On December 29, an attack against a military 
building in the province of Charkiya, in the Nile Delta, wounded at least four 
soldiers. They were claimed by the jihadist group Ansar Beit al-Makdis, a 
jihadist organization that began its operations in the Sinai desert with the 
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insurgency there on February 2011, just after the Egyptian Revolution. It 
bombed many pipelines carrying gas from Egypt to Israel, claimed 
responsibility for an attack on a military intelligence building in Ismailia in 
October 2013, as well as the 24 January 2014 Cairo bombings. 
Jihadist violence, in particular in Sinai, has become frequent and the 
military’s repression of Morsi’s legal government gives them a surplus of 
legitimacy.  
The army’s repression has not been able to curb it significantly and the 
worsening economic situation of the tribal groups and the proximity of Israel 
making any peaceful solution improbable. A crescendo in violence is in 
perspective. 
 
Violence against the Students 
 
Since the Egyptian revolution, students have become one of the major social 
activists. During the Mubarak era, students played a significant role in 
opposing the autocratic rule, many of the members of the April 6 Movement 
belonging to them. Still, in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, students 
became involved as individuals, not as a major social group. Since the 
school year of 2013, universities became the locus of protest movements 
against or for Morsi. In the 2013 Egypt’s Student Union elections, 
independent students won against the MB candidates and Mohamed Badran 
became its president. He has shown support for the new draft of the 
constitution backed by the military, alienating many students, opposed to the 
military coup. 
After Morsi’s overthrow in July 2013 students have become social 
activists as such, in particular within universities, within many new 
associations. The Students against the Coup (SAC) was formed after the so-
called “3 July Coup” and is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood students 
and their sympathizers, calling themselves Rabaaweya in reference to the 
mosque where more than 1000 people were killed in a sit-in by the security 
forces on August 14, 2013. Ain Shams university is one of the major theaters 
of their action. The boycott of exams on December 28, 2013 was another 
major action promoted by SAC. Still, in many universities the examination 
process went on normally. Another group of student activists, mainly secular 
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and leftist in their political leanings was constituted composed of the 6 April 
Youth, the Revolutionary Socialists, Misr al-Qawia Students and the 
Manifesto Group. They have been acting as a student branch of the 
Revolutionary Front created in September 2013, critical towards the MB as 
well as the military (AbdAllah, 2014). El-Midan Student Group belongs to 
the al-Dostour Party but it marked its autonomy from the political office 
back in 2012 when the students criticized many figures participating in the 
National Salvation Front of which al-Dostour party is a member, and then, 
when the party supported the police and the military in July 2013 to combat 
“terrorism”.   
Violence against the students by the military has been going on crescendo 
since the military coup, within and without the universities. 
One of the major universities to protest against the military coup of 2013 
has been al Azhar whose president Mohamed al-Tayeb officially sided with 
general Sissi after the demise of Morsi. The demonstrations reached their 
peak during the midyear examinations when Students against the Coup 
(SAC), mostly sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood, announced their 
boycott of the exams. 
The Engineering Student Union at University of Zagazig, the capital of at 
Ash Sharqiyah governorate, engaged in a strike on November 16, 2013, 
asking for the release of the detained students and the resignation of the 
Dean, among other claims. On the same day Security forces stormed into the 
university after the authorization by its President, detaining number of 
students believed to be MB sympathizers. The attacks triggered protests at 
other faculties in the university. Other universities joined the strike, among 
them Ain Shams faculties of Engineering, Medicine, Helwan Faculties of 
Engineering… Students belonging to the MB demonstrated in different 
universities, commemorating 100 days after the “Rabaa massacre” of August 
14 in al Azhar, Cairo, Zagarig, Helwan and Beni Suef. 
In January 2014, before the third anniversary of the Revolution, many 
protest movements by students were crushed by the security forces. In 
Assiut University, on Sunday January 5, 2014 demonstrators were met with 
birdshots by the security forces, leading to more than 50 students injured. 
Police stormed into university campuses.  
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All in all, during the Morsi Presidency and the interim government after 
the military coup, students became one of the major activists against the 
Powers that be. Violence towards them within and without the university 
became one of the salient features of the new regime, after the coup. 
Conclusion 
 
One major mottos of the Egyptian revolution was peacefulness or lack of 
violence (Selmiyah). After the revolution, the combination of the Islamists’ 
winning the elections, and the inability of the new political actors to reach a 
compromise resulted in mutual distrust and demonization, culminating in a 
military coup.  
There was a growing sense of impatience towards the political stalemate, 
and Morsi’s inept and sometimes arrogant style of government pushed the 
opposition towards radicalization. A new attitude among many opposition 
groups became prevalent, regarding violence as legitimate against the 
government. Part of the revolutionary youth engaged in street violence that 
became endemic in some cities. Violence became even bloodier with the 
Military coup, the prospect of a peaceful transition to democracy becoming 
dim after the overthrow of the first democratically elected President, Morsi.  
The military coup opened up a new era of ordeal for the MB. This political 
organization, one of the oldest in modern Egypt and one of the most 
influential in the Muslim world, had been, for more than half a century, a 
political body used to clandestinity and repression. At best, the organization 
was partly tolerated (as around 2005’s parliamentary elections), by Mubarak. 
But its public activities were short-lived since its inception in 1928 and the 
old organization returned invariably to its semi-clandestine, semi-public 
status after short periods of open activity (in the 2010 parliamentary 
elections the Muslim Brotherhood was denied the facilities of 2005). The 
Egyptian Revolution of 2011 gave the MB the opportunity to become a 
public organization with a central political role. But the semi-clandestine 
apparatus did not easily mutate into a political organization and the old 
reflexes and suspicions remained among its members, except for a thin layer 
of the youth among them, the latter being marginalized by the old MB 
members within a gerontocratic hierarchy. The MB remained, up to the very 
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end, a Janus bifrons: it oscillated between the old attitudes of opacity and 
secrecy represented by parts of its members and the new necessities for 
openness and communication in an era of turbulence and revolutionary 
impatience. The identity crisis was the deeper as the MB took the helms of 
power almost by “enchantment”. It sent its members to the parliament and 
became the largest political party in Egypt (more than 40% of the members 
of the new parliament belonged to it), then its candidate for Presidency was 
elected (with the fourth of the votes, due to the split among the opposition 
groups), all of this without the MB’s being prepared to take the reins of the 
government by having a clear vision of the future for Egypt. More precisely, 
the MB took power without having any political program, strategic vision or 
economic platform to address the major challenges facing the post 
revolutionary Egypt (Hassan, n.d.). At the same time, most of Egypt’s Deep 
State (Levinson & Bradley, 2014) (at the top of which, the interior ministry, 
the largest part of the security forces, the ministry of justice’s organizations 
headed by the judges, more generally, large parts of the state bureaucracy) 
refused to cooperate with the MB and went on an implicit strike during the 
entire period of Morsi’s presidency.  
Comparing the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 to the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran in 1979, one has to recognize that more than three decades after the 
debacle of the secular classes in Iran, in Egypt secular classes have become 
more self-conscious than before. When ayatollah Khomeyni took the reins of 
power, he found a disunited and a divided secular middle class, whose 
members were deeply suspicious to each others in ideological terms: leftist 
revolutionaries versus non-political technocratic middle classes. The leftist 
ideology minored the role of the Islamists who were supposed to be the 
members of the traditional “petty bourgeoisie” with whom the 
revolutionaries should cooperate more willingly than with the class enemies 
of the “liberal bourgeoisie” who were “counter-revolutionaries”. 
Ideologically blinded leftist secular middle classes were more sympathetic to 
the Islamists’ views of religion and daily life than to their fellow members of 
the middle classes whom they accused of an imaginary subservience to the 
“imperialist international bourgeoisie”, this blindness continued with the 
Iranian Tudeh (the Communist Party) cooperating with the Khomeynist 
regime until they were liquidated by it. The “Islamist” dimension of the 
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revolution was thus minored and treated as an insignificant “superstructure” 
against the “infrastructure” of the economic relations that should determine 
“in the last resort” the political and social allegiances (the Khomeynist 
“petty bourgeois” regime was supposed to be more inclined towards working 
class people than the mythical Iranian “grand bourgeoisie” that would side 
with the imperialist West). With the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, after 
two years of Islamist rule (by far less stringent in religious terms than the 
Iranian Theocracy), the secular classes refused submission to Islamist norms 
restricting one’s daily life in the name of the Sharia. Although the opposition 
Secular/Islamist does not give a comprehensive picture of the military coup 
in Egypt in July 2013 and the public attitude of the secular middle classes in 
Tunisia, still, this dimension remains one of the major axes around which 
opposing actors evolved before and after the military coup in Egypt and 
during the period extending from the murder of the two secular leaders in 
Tunisia (Shukri Belaid’s killing on February 6, 2013 and Mohamad Brahmi, 
on July 25, 2013) until the resignation of the Ennahda Prime minister and 
the adoption of the new secular constitution  on January 26, 2014. Secular, 
middle class or “would-be” middle class actors henceforth refuse to play the 
role assigned to them by the radical Islamists who view “revolution” as the 
restoration of coercive religious values, in particular towards women’s 
modesty and their “decency”, whereas the new generations view their 
personal freedom as paramount and reject being imposed those religious 
norms that would jeopardize it. This tension structured the large protest 
movements against Morsi in Egypt and in a less radical way, against the 
Ennahda Party in Tunisia during the entire year of 2013. 
By overthrowing Morsi, the Egyptian army and the opposition 
epitomized violence as the major means of achieving their political goals. 
The use and abuse of the words “terrorists”, “terrorism” and the like, to 
characterize the MB by the media supportive of the army and the opponents 
to Morsi is reminiscent of the intolerant language of authoritarianism that 
was fought by the revolutionaries at the outset of the January 25 Revolution. 
The lesson might not be forgotten in the future crises, the “political 
memory” privileging the use of violence to the detriment of the legal and 
institutional means every time discontent simmers against the political 
leadership. 
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In summary, at the beginning of the Arab revolutions, almost everywhere 
dignity of the citizen (karamah) and non-violence (selmiyah) were the two 
inseparable notions singling out these uprisings from the Nationalist and 
Islamist ones in the past7. The evolution of the movements challenged the 
fragile dignity of the citizen, violence emerging as the only appropriate 
response to the government repression and ineptitude, be it in Yemen, Syria 
or Libya. With the exception of Tunisia where a sense of compromise 
prevailed and the Islamist government subscribed to a consensual new 
Constitution (in part for fear of suffering the same fate as the MB in Egypt), 
almost everywhere two factors combined to debilitate the new movement for 
the dignity of the citizens: the authoritarian state and geopolitics. In Egypt, 
the Morsi government was insensitive to consensus. Youth’s revolutionary 
impatience was also detrimental to the preservation of dignity since it 
promoted violent street action that in turn put into question toleration and 
politics according to the supremacy of the law. Dignity divorced from non-
violence, exerting a disruptive impact on social dialogue. In Egypt, the 
military coup opened a chasm between dignity and peacefulness, each side 
begrudging the other’s violence. The “dignity revolutions” found in Egypt a 
tragic ending, the major notions around which they evolved being sharply 
questioned by the street violence and the Coup d’Etat.  
The military coup has been alternately interpreted in two divergent 
manners. For the first version, it was not a coup from above but what a 
popular movement aspired to, the military being only the performers of a 
composition written down and played by the people. According to this 
understanding, the “Neo-Seculars” salvaged the Egyptian society from the 
lasting domination of the MB who intended to impose Islamist rule on the 
people. Within this framework, the coup was a political-military action of 
the Egyptian society against the inept and hegemonic MB. 
The second reading regards the military coup as an illegitimate act of 
violence against a fragile but burgeoning democracy that was suppressed by 
the alliance of intolerant groups who did not submit to the majority rule. 
Both of these views can lay claim to a partial truth. But the 
democratization process has largely suffered from the military intervention, 
many groups preferring the authoritarianism of the army to the unruly 
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democratization process that was open-ended and created chaos and 
uncertainty.  
The rising expectations of the lower classes after the 2011 revolution as 
well as the fear of the secular classes towards the MB as an Islamist party 
inclined to “brotherize” (ikhwanah) (that is, to put under the aegis of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) the state apparatus blended into a protest movement 
manipulated by the powerful military establishment, resulting in the 
overthrow of Morsi and the return to power of the military. Since then, three 
major events have taken place: 
- the protest movement by the MB’s supporters continued unabated up to 
February 2014, more and more vigorously repressed by the military, ending 
up with numerous deaths (more than thousand) and arrests. With the 
military’s aim at imposing its rule on the street (prohibition of 
demonstrations without the authorities’ leave), part of the secular 
revolutionaries who were opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, joined the 
new loose opposition to the new State (among others, the April 6 
Movement…). In December 2013 the Egyptian government declared MB a 
terrorist organization and seized the remainder of its assets, all its activities 
becoming illegal.  
- a tiny part of the MB’s youth joined the jihadists and became involved in 
the violent action against the military and the police. In Sinai almost on a 
daily basis and in the large cities more or less sporadically, a nucleus of a 
new jihadist group took shape that fights through violent means against the 
military rule. 
- the large majority of the revolutionaries, especially the youth, is in a state 
of despair and apathy, the ideals of the 2011 Revolution being more and 
more put into question by the new regime, the majority claiming more 
security and stability even at the detriment of freedom, due to the desperate 
economic situation of the lower classes. The Constitution, approved by the 
overwhelming majority of those who went to the polls (more than 98%) with 
a turnout of 38,6% of the voters gave a large clout to the army. Those who 
demonstrated against the vote were harshly repressed, especially in the third 
anniversary of the revolution (49 people died, 1079 were arrested (Kingsley, 
2014) and the day before the January 25th, explosions killed 10 people and 
injured around 80 close to the Cairo security directorate building, the attacks 
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being claimed by a Jihadist group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis). Prominent figures 
of the 2011 Revolution are in prison (Ahmed Maher, Mohamed Adel, 
Ahmed Douma, Alaa Abdel Fattah) and prominent members of the Mubarak 
regime coming back to the political stage (the so-called fulul).  
The need for security and stability is valued by the silent majority over 
the turmoil that was prevalent for three years since the revolution, during 
which no perspective of compromise between the power holders and the 
radicalized activists loomed on the horizon. The military rule opened up a 
new era, xenophobia and suspicion towards any dissent finding their 
justification in an attitude of passive acceptance of the military rule by the 
voters, the army being regarded as the only dependable institution within a 
society in deep crisis. 
 
 
Notes  
1 The official fact-finding mission investigating the death toll of Egypt’s revolution 
announced that at least 846 were killed and 6,467 injured. See 
www.egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:269/coping-with-the-revolution/secId:6 
2 The claims by the revolutionaries in Egypt as well as in Tunisia had no direct bearing to 
religion. In Tunisia, the young Bouazizi who committed suicide did it without any regard to 
religion (generally speaking, Islam condemns suicide and his act had no direct bearing to 
martyrdom). On the Tahrir Square in Cairo, none of the slogans had direct religious 
justification or claim to it. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were “postislamist” in the 
sense that social demands supposed, in their formulation, a social realm distinct from the 
religious one, this division of the spheres being not regarded as anti-Islamic by the 
protagonists. What was at the center of the claims was the end of autocracy, corruption and 
exclusion of the people from the political arena. The “secular” side of these two 
paradigmatic revolutions point to this fact. This view is however different from the secular 
ones in the West in that it leaves in limbo all those aspects of “democracy” that can become 
conflictive with Islam, like the citizenship issue (should non-Muslims have the same 
political rights as Muslims?), the question of the “apostasy” (ridda), of banking (the notion 
of riba’, usury)… Those who set off the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt “ignored” these 
questions, they were not frontally anti-religious, nor atheists, but “secularized believers” for 
most of them (besides part of the Diaspora that had adopted Western secular views). 
3 The word “secular” with its Western connotations is difficult to use without caveats. By 
secular Muslims (or Secular) I mean those who were distinct in their worldviews from the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, who did not believe that major reforms should adopt a 
mould according to the Sharia’ and who were mostly “non-practicing” Muslims, without 
denying to Islam its moral and social legitimacy. They were “secularized” in an ambiguous 
manner, not against Islam, but by loosening their ties to the religious prescriptions. Only a 
tiny minority were “secular” in the Western sense, mostly among the upper middle classes or 
the Diaspora. Still, religion was not at the forefront of their claims, social justice and 
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political opening being their major concern. See for the ambivalence of this type of 
secularization in the new generations in Iran. 
4 Glen Johnson and Luke Harding profiles at The Guardian: 
www.guardian.co.uk/profile/glen-Johnson, www.guardian.co.uk/profile/lukeharding. 
Retrieved on Tuesday 20th December 2011. 
5 David D. Kirkpatrick 8/5/ 2011 New York Times 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/david-d-
kirkpatrick/index.html?inline=nyt-per 
6 Anti-Morsi authorities estimated the number of the street demonstrators against him on June 
30, 2013 ranging from 14,3 to 33 millions. According to the calculations made by taking into 
account the surface of the places where demonstrations took place, the maximum number of 
the people around Tahrir Square and the adjacent streets would be less than 700.000. The 
reference by the sympathizers of the military to Google Earth was unsubstantiated and the 
total number of the people in the streets in the major cities would be by far less than 2 
millions (MEMO, 2013). 
7 See for a discussion about these three types of social movements in the history of the 
Muslim world (Khosrokhavar, 2012). 
 
 
References 
 
AbdAllah, A.H. (2014, July 7). A map to Egyptian universities’ indignation. 
Daily News Egypt. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/01/07/a-map-to-egyptian-
universities-indignation/#sthash.MYHWOUzp.dpbs 
Abdalla, N. (2012, October). Egypt’s workers. From protest movement to 
organized labor. A major challenge of the transition period. Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik Comments, 32. Retrieved from 
http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C32_abn.pdf 
Abdel-Hamid, Ch. (2013, February 27). Politique: L'éducation en Egypte 
prise pour cible. Hebdo Al-Ahram. Retrieved from 
hebdo.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/963/10/124/1803/Politique-
Léducation-en-Egypte-prise-pour-cible.aspx  
Afify, H. (2013, April 10). Amid security failures and prejudice, small 
sparks can set sectarian violence alight. Egypt Independent. Retrieved 
from http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1635841 
Al-Haj, A. (2012, June 15). Yemen says more than 2.000 killed in uprising. 
The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1)  31 
 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-
more-than-2000-killed-in-
uprising/2012/03/18/gIQAGOtcLS_story.html 
Al Jazeera English (2011). Arab women organized demonstrations and 
pickets, mobilized fellow citizens, and expressed their demands for 
democratic change. Al Jazeera English. 
Al-Naggar, M. (2013, March 19). Egypte, les étudiants disent non aux Frères 
musulmans. Al-Shourouk. Retrieved from 
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2013/03/19/les-etudiants-
disent-non-aux-freres-musulmans 
Al-Tahrir (2013, March 5). Égypt. Affrontements à Port-Saïd: police et 
armée dans des camps opposes. Courrier International. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.courrierinternational.com/breve/2013/03/05/affrontements
-a-port-said-police-et-armee-dans-des-camps-opposes 
Al-Youm, A.M. (2013, March 3). Four April 6 members arrested in Nasr 
City protest. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1602741 
Al-Youm, A.M. (2013, April 5). Clashes between pro, anti-Morsi protesters 
in Alexandria. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1621506 
Asia News (2013, July 6). Intellectuals protest against the islamization of 
Egyptian culture. Asia News. Retrieved from 
http://www.asianews.it/view4print.php?l=en&art=28135 
Associated Press (2012, May 5). Report: 338 killed during Tunisia 
revolution. Fox News. Retrieved from 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/05/report-338-killed-during-
tunisia-revolution/ 
Beaumont, P., & Harris, P. (2011, December 29). US 'deeply concerned' 
after Egyptian forces raid NGO offices in Cairo. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/peterbeaumont 
Carr, S. (2011, October 10). A first-hand account: Marching from Shubra to 
deaths at Maspiro. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/firsthand-account-marching-
shubra-deaths-maspero 
32 Khosrokhavar – Violence in Arab Revolutions, Egypt 
 
 
Crisis Watch (2013, August 1). Monthly Bulletin, August 2013. Crisis 
Watch, 120. Retrieved from: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/CrisisWatch/2013/cw120.pd
f?utm_source=cw120email&utm_medium=full&utm_campaign=cw 
Daily Motion (2012, April 21). Talk to Al Jazeera. Why Arab women still 
'have no voice'. An interview to Amal al-Malki. Daily Motion. 
Retrieved from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xr4898_talk-to-al-
jazeera-why-arab-women-still-have-no-voice_news#.USOMmOgj6Uc 
Dettmer, J. (2013, January 11). Egypt’s newest Jihadists: The Jamal 
Network. The Daily Beast. Retrieved from 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/01/egypt-s-newest-
jihadists-the-jamal-network.html 
Egypt Independent (2013, June 4). Morsy’s talks with politicians, Ethiopia 
“war” broadcast on TV spurs criticism. Egypt Independent. Retrieved 
from http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1811886 
Egypt Independent (2013, June 6). Report: Egypt averaged two protests an 
hour in May. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1805891 
Egypt Independent (2013, March 29). High Court protests end early friday 
evening. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1602996 
Eriksen, M. (2011, August 18). Women’s groups relaunch Egyptian 
Feminist Union. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/506231 
Fadel, L., & Hassieb, I. (2012, May 22). Egyptian women feel excluded, 
despite the promise of the revolution. Washington Post. Retrieved 
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-women-feel-
excluded-despite-the-promise-of-the-
revolution/2012/05/21/gIQAXeEkgU_story.html 
Fahim, K., & El Sheikh, M. (2013, March 31). Egypt orders arrest of satirist 
over skits on Islam and Morsi. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/world/middleeast/egypt-orders-
arrest-of-satirist-for-skits-on-islam-and-
morsi.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print 
International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1)  33 
 
 
Frémont, A.L. (2013, March 15). Egypte: plaidoyer des Frères contre 
l'égalité des femmes. Le Figaro. Retrieved from 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/03/15/01003-
20130315ARTFIG00627-egypte-plaidoyer-des-freres-contre-l-egalite-
des-femmes.php 
Hassan, K. (n.d.). The future of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: No 
'Ikhwanization of State', but a 'Statification of Ikwan'. [Lecture by 
Hivos' Kawa Hassan at the University of Groningen]. Retrieved from 
Hivos Knowledge Programme website: http://www.hivos.net/Hivos-
Knowledge-Programme/Themes/Civil-Society-in-West-
Asia/News/Hivos-analyzes-the-future-of-the-Egyptian-Muslim-
Brotherhood 
Husain, E. (2012, January 24). Where next for Egypt’s secularists? [Web log 
post]. Retrieved from http://blogs.cfr.org/husain/2012/01/24/where-
next-for-egypts-secularists/ 
Human Rights Watch (2013, August 19). Egypt: Security forces used 
excessive lethal force, worst mass unlawful killings in country’s 
Modern history. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-
excessive-lethal-force 
Ibrahim, G. (2013, March 3). Workers' rights in Egypt stalled two years after 
the revolution. VICE. Retrieved from http://www.vice.com/read/for-
labor-in-egypt-little-progess-since-the-revolution 
International Crisis Group (2011, February 24). Popular protest in North 
Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt victorious? Middle East/North 
Africa Report No. 101. International Crisis Group. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org   
Iskander, M. (2013, June 5). Demonstrating artists break into Ministry of 
Culture. Daily News Egypt. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/05/demonstrating-artists-
break-into-ministry-of-culture/ 
Karin, L. (2011, September 8). Libyan estimate: At least 30,000 died in the 
war. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9835879 
34 Khosrokhavar – Violence in Arab Revolutions, Egypt 
 
 
Khosrokhavar, F. (2012). The New Arab Revolutions that shook the world. 
Bolder and London: Paradigm Publishers. 
Khosrokhavar, F., & Nikpey, A. (2009). Avoir vingt ans au pays des 
ayatollahs: la vie quotidienne des jeunes à Qom. Paris: Robert 
Laffont.  
Kingsley, P. (2014, January 26). Egypt: 49 people killed in protests on third 
anniversary of uprising. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/26/egypt-49-killed-
protests-third-anniversary-uprising 
Kirkpatrick, D.D., & El Sheikh, M. (2013, March 14). Muslim 
Brotherhood’s statement on women stirs liberals’ fears. New York 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/world/middleeast/muslim-
brotherhoods-words-on-women-stir-liberal-fears.html 
LeVine, M. (2011, December 5). Tahrir's late night conversations. Al 
Jazeera English. Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/201112511219971
906.html 
Levinson, Ch., & Bradley, M. (2013, July 19). In Egypt, the 'Deep State' 
rises again. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324425204578601700051
224658.html?mod=trending_now_4 
MENA (2013, March 29). Violence erupts in Alexandria, Zagazig protests. 
Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1603091 
MEMO (2013, July 16). June 30 anti-Morsi crowd figures just don't add up. 
Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/commentary-and-
analysis/6574-30-june-anti-morsi-crowd-figures-just-dont-add-up 
Ortiz, V. (2011, December 5). Hidden in Egypt’s closet: Virginity testing as 
a tactic of repression. Waging On Violence. Retrieved from 
http://wagingnonviolence.org/2011/12/hidden-in-
egypt%E2%80%99s-closet-virginity-testing%E2%80%99-as-a-tactic-
of-repression/ 
International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1)  35 
 
 
Osman, A.Z. (2013, April 4). Roots of religious violence lie in both state and 
society. Egypt Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1644101 
Sallam, H. (2011, Summer). Striking back at Egyptian workers (ihtijajat 
fia’wiya). Middle East Research and Information Project 259. North 
Africa. The Political Economy of Revolt, 41. Retrieved from 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer259/striking-back-egyptian-workers 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2013, April 1). Syrian Observatory 
for Human Rights Facebook’s Web Page. Retrieved from: 
http://www.facebook.com/syriaohr/posts/354743437967334 
Taha, R.M. (2013, June 24). Democracy Index: 9427 protests during Morsi’s 
first year. Daily News Egypt. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/24/democracy-index-9427-
protests-during-morsis-first-year/ 
 
 
Farhad Khosrokhavar is professor at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales, member of the Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention 
Sociologique. 
Contact Address: UMR 8039 CNRS-EHESS, 190-198, Avenue de 
France -75244- Paris Cedex 13. Phone: +33 01 49 54 25 63. Email: 
cavard@ehess.fr 
